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DEVELOPMENTAL COSTS UNDER THE PRUDENT
INVESTMENT THEORY
By WILLIAM C. BURT t and JAMES L. HIGHSAW *
I. INTRODUCTION
The recent Supreme Court cases of Federal Power Commission v.
Hope Natural Gas Co.' and Federal Power Commission v. Natural
Gas Pipeline Co.2 open a new era in judicial review of rates set by
administrative bodies. What these cases decide for the future of rate
making is not clear. It is, however, certain that in procedure at least
they mark a clean break with past decisions. Rate-making bodies will
no longer be confined in a judicial strait-jacket of a present value rate
base. Commissions will have wider discretion in fixing rates.
Moreover,' the court has given some encouragement to those who
with Mr. Justice Brandeis have maintained that under the Constitu-
tion a public utility is not necessarily' entitled to a fair return on the
present value of its holdings measured by the cost of reproducing the
present plant. While the Court did not impose the rule of "prudent
investment" on rate making, it at least indicated that Commissions
under certain circumstances may measure the rate base by the prudent
investment in property useful to the public service without risk of auto-
matic reversal by the courts.
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1. 320 U. S. 591, 64 Sup. Ct. 281, 88 L. Ed. 333 (944).
2. 315 U. S. 575, 62 Sup. Ct. 736, 86 L. Ed. 1037 (942).
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The more general acceptance of these views is not the end of a
struggle, but the beginning of a new conception of rate making. These
concepts are now being haltingly and somewhat vaguely articulated by
a court that agrees on overthrowing the rigid standards of the past,
but cannot agree on standards or even the necessity of standards for
the future. The sharp disagreement on new concepts of rate making
means that the new standards for the judicial review of rates will not
be hastily stated and dogmatically held, but will be tempered by free
discussion and sharp disagreement until new standards are formed
which will stand the test of argument.
The very fact that the court austerely refrains from commenting
on how rates should be fixed puts the burden of developing the new
concepts of rate making on the administrative agencies. Since these
agencies have a nodding acquaintance with the general nature of the
prudent investment theory, it is likely that they will embrace the
familiar. In fixing rates for many utilities during the next few years
this method will be widely used.
When rate-making bodies thus freed of many judicial restrictions
get down to deciding specific cases, it will be found that the general
counsel of "prudent investment," valuable as it may be as a frame of
reference, offers little specific guidance. It is believed, however, that
the decisions of the court under the present value theories have slowly
evolved specific concepts of determining a rate base which offers guid-
ance to rate-making bodies in fixing rates under the prudent investment
theory. These concepts will offer some relief from the pandemonium
of judicial schizophrenia forecast by the sharp split in the court in
the Hope case.
Previously the court had required that rates received by a utility
be high enough to give a utility a fair return on the "present value"
of its property. Otherwise the rate was considered confiscatory and
unconstitutional. A classic method of computing "present value" has
been to estimate the cost of reproducing under present conditions a
plant identical with the utility whose rate base is being established.
Thus evidence of "reproduction cost" was accepted as proof of present
value upon which fair return must be allowed. In computing the
"present value" or "reproduction cost," the court early recognized that
a well-developed going concern had more "present value" than an in-
cipient, immature enterprise. Allowance was required for this, and a
concept of "going concern" was developed.
There would, of course, be no going concern value as such under
the prudent investment theory. Prudent investment is concerned with
past capital invested in the enterprise rather than an appraisal of
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"value" at the present time. It is the "past investment" in rather than
the "present value" of the enterprise that counts. One such capital
investment, however, is the cost of developing the business to a going
concern. This capital investment in developmental cost is roughly
equivalent to what has been regarded as "going concern" value under
the present value doctrines. The technique of the courts in measuring
these developmental costs is believed pertinent in any attempt to es-
tablish a rate base under the prudent investment theory. This article
is concerned with how developmental costs should be measured in a
prudent investment rate base.
II. GENERAL CONSIDERATION OF THE PRUDENT INVESTMENT THEORY
There has been little -discussion by the United States Supreme
Court as to what governs the determination of a prudent investment
rate base. The concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Brandeis in the case
of Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Service
Commission of Missouri 3 contains the classic discussion. Mr. Justice
Brandeis stated:
"The so-called rule of Smyth v. Ames is, in my opinion,
legally and economically unsound. The thing devoted by the in-
vestor to the public use is not specific property, tangible and in-
tangible, but capital embarked in the enterprise. Upon the cap-
ital so invested the Federal Constitution guarantees to the utility
the opportunity to earn a fair return." 4
"What is now termed the prudent investment is, in essence,
the same thing as that which the Court has always sought to pro-
tect in using the term present value. Twenty-five years ago, when
Smyth v. Ames was decided, it was impossible to ascertain with
accuracy, in respect to most of the utilities, in most of the States
in which rate controversies arose, what it cost in money to estab-
lish the utility; or what the money cost with which the utility was
established; or what income had been earned by it; or how the
income had been expended. It was, therefore, not feasible, then,
to adopt, as the rate base, the amount properly invested or, as the
rate of fair return, the amount of the capital charge. Now the
situation is fundamentally different." 5
In a footnote, Mr. Justice Brandeis discusses the identity of pru-
dent investment with historical cost, 6 stating:
3. 262 U. S. 276, 289, 43 Sup. Ct. 544, 547, 67 L. Ed. 981, 985 (1923).
4. Id. at 290, 43 Sup. Ct. at 547, 67 L. Ed. at 986.
5. Id. at 308, 43 Sup. Ct. at 553-4, 67 L. Ed. at 994.
6. Massachusetts,'unlike Mr. Justice Brandeis, distinguishes historical cost from
prudent investment. Prudent investment is measured by the amount of money pru-
dently invested by bofidholders and stockholders. Historical cost looks to the other
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"(d) Historical cost, i. e., the proper cost of the existing
plant and business, estimated on the basis of the price levels ex-
isting at the respective dates when the plant and the additions were
constructed. This is often called prudent investment. Historical
cost would, under normal conditions, be equal in amount to the
original cost. . . . In determining actual cost, whatever the evi-
dence, there is no attempt to determine whether the expenditure
was wise or foolish, or whether it was useful or wasteful. His-
torical cost, on the other hand, is the amount which normally
should have been paid for all the property which is usefully de-
voted to the public service. It is, in effect, what is termed the
prudent investment. In enterprise efficiently launched and devel-
oped, historical cost and original cost would practically coincide
both in items included and in amounts paid. That is, the sub-
jects of expenditure would coincide; and the cost at prices prevail-
ing at the time of installation would substantially coincide with the
actual cost." 7
Under the prudent investment theory as conceived by Mr. Justice
Brandeis the rate base is measured by the capital employed in the en-
terprise, i. e. the amount devoted by the investor to the public use.
Prudent investment is equal to historical cost, and the historical cost
"is the amount which normally should have been paid for all the prop-
erty which is usefully devoted to the public service."
In Federal Power Commission v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co.' tem-
porary rates had been fixed by the Federal Power Commission on the
basis of reproduction cost. The Court had been asked by counsel to
rule definitely upon the propriety of the use of a prudent investment
base and as to the propriety of refusing to consider reproduction cost
testimony. The Court, after upholding the constitutionality of the
Natural Gas Act of 1938 9 and the validity of the interim order, dis-
cussed the scope of judicial review of rates as follows:
"The Constitution does not bind rate-making bodies to the
service of any single formula or combination of formulas. Agen-
cies to whom this legislative power has been delegated are free,
within the ambit of their statutory authority, to make the prag-
matic adjustments which may be called for by particular circum-
stances. Once a fair hearing has been given, proper findings
made and other statutory requirements satisfied, the courts can-
not intervene in the absence of a clear showing that the limits
of due process have been overstepped. If the Commission's or-
side of the balance sheet and is the amount prudently invested in assets used and useful
in the public service. The Massachusetts concept of prudent investment is peculiarly
applicable where the Commission has control over issuance of securities by the utility.
Otherwise a rate might be paid on watered or overvalued securities.
7. Id. at 295, 43 Sup. Ct. at 549, 67 L. Ed. at 998. (Italics supplied.)
8. 315 U. S. 575, 62 Sup. Ct. 736, 86 L. Ed. 1037 (1942).
9. 52 STAT. 821 (1938), 15 U. S. C. §717 (1941).
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der, as applied to the facts before it and viewed in its entirety, pro-
duces no arbitrary result, our inquiry is at an end." 10
This statement of the Court gives some sanction to the use of the
prudent investment theory for the determination of the rate base. If
rate-making bodies are not bound "to the service of any single for-
mula or combination of formulas," certainly a rate-making body is
free in some cases to exclude evidence of reproduction cost and to
fix the rate on the sole basis of the prudent investment." It should be
noted, however, that since the interim rate fixed by the Commission
was based upon reproduction cost, the case cannot be interpreted as a
holding that prudent investment is proper. Nor does the case give
any specific indication of what should properly be included in a pru-
dent investment rate base.
In Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co.'2 the
majority opinion upheld a rate order issued by the Federal Power
Commission reducing the rates chargeable by the Hope Natural Gas
Co. The commission in fixing the rate had used a prudent investfment
rate base composed of "actual legitimate cost" less depletion and de-
predation and plus unoperated acreage, working capital and future
capital additions.
The Court upheld the rate. It held that the method used to fix
the rates was immaterial as long as the sum produced was sufficient
to maintain the capital integrity of the enterprise. Mr. Justice Douglas
in speaking for the majority of the Court stated:
"It is not theory but the impact of the rate order which counts.
If the total effect of the rate order cannot be said to be unjust and
unreasonable, judicial inquiry under the Act is at an end. The
fact that the method employed to reach that result may contain
infirmities is not then important ...
"The rate-making process under the Act, i. e., the fixing of
'just and reasonable' rates, involves a balancing of the investor
and the consumer interests. . . . From the investor or company
point of view it is important that there be enough revenue not only
for operating expenses but also for the capital costs of the busi-
ness. These include service on the debt and dividends on the
stock. Cf. Chicago & Grand Trunk Ry. Co. v. Wellman, 143
IO. 315 U. S. 575, 586, 62 Sup. Ct. 736, 743, 86 L. Ed. 1037, 1049-50 (942).
(Italics supplied.)
I. The concurring opinion of Justices Black and Douglas interpret the majority
opinion as freeing the commission "from the compulsion of admitting evidence of repro-
duction cost" and permitting the adoption of prudent investment as a rate base. While
this is not controlling, it is nevertheless persuasive. It should further be noted that in
the Hope case Mr. Justice Jackson stated that he did not believe the opinion in the
Natural Gas case sanctioned the use of "prudent investment" in all cases of utility regu-
lation, but conceded it would be proper in some cases.
12. 320 U. S. 591, 64 Sup. Ct. 281, 88 L. Ed. 333 (1944).
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U. S. 339, 345-346. By that standard the return to the equity
owner should be commensurate with returns on investments in
other enterprises having corresponding risks. That return, more-
over, should be sufficient to assure confidence in the financial in-
tegrity of the enterprise, so as to maintain its credit and to at-
tract capital. See Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v.
Public Service Commission, 262 U. S. 276, 291 (Mr. Justice
Brandeis concurring). The conditions under which more or less
might be allowed are not important here. Nor is it important to
this case to determine the various permissible ways in which any
rate base on which the rate is computed might be arrived at. For
we are of the view that the end result in this case cannot be con-
demned under the Act as unjust and unreasonable from the in-
vestor or company viewpoint." 13
"Rates which enable the company to operate successfully, to
maintain its financial integrity, to attract capital, and to compen-
sate its investors for the risks assumed certainly cannot be con-
demned as invalid, even though they might produce only a meager
return on the so-called 'fair value' rate base..
This case set up a unique test for checking the validity of a rate.
It examined the right- rather than the left-hand side of the balance
sheet and tested the end result produced by the rate on the financial
structure of the enterprise. It is not the purpose of this article to dis-
cuss the merits of this procedure.15 It is sufficient to say, however, that
the majority specifically sustained a rate based on the prudent
investment theory even though it would have produced a "meager"
return on the present value of the enterprise.' Apparently, too, un-
less the lump sum produced by the rate is obviously insufficient, it will
be upheld by the Court. A broad discretion is permitted the com-
mission.
The case, however, gives no clue as to what elements should, be
considered in determining prudent investment rate base. If the end
result satisfies the test, the Court will sustain the rate. It specifically
refused to consider whether well-drilling and other costs should un-
der the prudent investment theory be included in the rate base."
13. Id. at 6o2, 603, 64 Sup. Ct. at 288, 88 L. Ed. at 345.
14. Id. at 6o5, 64 Sup. Ct. at 289, 88 L. Ed. at 346. (Italics supplied.)
15. The test used by the Court apparently assumes that the present capital struc-
ture of the utility is sound. If, for example, a utility had watered or overvalued secu-
rity, an administrative agency should not be required to pay a rate high enough to
maintain the "financial integrity" of the inflated security. Unquestionably the general
test of the Hope case will be refined and particularized in future cases.
16. The dissenting opinions of Justices Jackson, Reed, and Frankfurter concur in
the propriety of using a prudent investment rate base at least under some conditions.
17. The Court stated: "In view of this disposition of the controversy we need not
stop to inquire whether the failure of the Commission to add the $17,000,000 of well-
drilling and other costs to the rate was consistent with the prudent investment theory
as developed and applied in the particular cases." Id. at 605-6, 64 Sup. Ct. at 289, 88
- L. Ed. at 346-7.
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III. DEVELOPMENTAL COSTS UNDER THE PRUDENT INVESTMENT
THEORY AS THE EQUIVALENT OF GOING CONCERN VALUE UN-
DER THE PRESENT VALUE THEORY
While the cases supra offer little in the way of detail as to what
items should be included in a prudent investment rate base, they do
offer a useful general concept. The rate base is the amount which
normally should have been paid for all the property which was use-
fully devoted to the public service. As a matter of inference, capital
invested to develop the business to its present state as a going con-
cern may be logically included in prudent investment rate base.
Moreover, in fixing a rate base under the present value theory the
standards and tests of measuring "going concern value" were em-
ployed which were as appropriate to the prudent investment theory as
they were inappropriate to the present value theory. The Supreme
Court had long felt that a well-developed "going concern" had more
"present value" than an incipient business, and it tried to measure this
in two general ways. In the first place, it has been measured as an
increment of value accruing to the property used in the public service
because it is an established plant doing business and earning money,
i. e. a going concern.18 Actually this increment was on any realistic
basis indistinguishable from "good will" which the court had brusquely
refused to include in the rate base.19 In some cases this has been com-
puted as a separate addition to the value of the physical property.20 In
others the general appraisal of the physical assets is held to appraise
the plant as a going concern.21 This first measure of going concern is
a value concept peculiarly pertaining to the reproduction cost theory
where the attempt is to compute the "present value" of the plant. It
has no relation to the prudent investment theory where the rate base
is limited to and measured by the "investment" of the past rather
than an appraisal of "present value."
In the second place, going concern value has been measured by
the cost of developing the business to a going concern. The procedure
and standard of measurement used by the Court in ascertaining the
18. McCardle v. Indianapolis Water Co., 272 U. S. 400, 47 Sup. Ct. 144, 71 L. Ed.
316 (1926) ; Denver v. Denver Union Water Co., 246 U. S. 178, 38 Sup. Ct. 278, 62 L.
Ed. 649 (1918).
ig. Willcox v. Consolidated Gas Co., 212 U. S. 19, 29 Sup. Ct. 192, 53 L. Ed. 382
(1909).
20. McCardle v. Indianapolis Water Co., 272 U. S. 400, 47 Sup. Ct. 144, 71 L. Ed.
316 (1926).
21. Columbus Gas & Fuel Co. v. Public Utilities Commission of Ohio, 292 U. S.
398, 54 Sup. Ct. 763, 78 L. Ed. 1327 (934) ; Los Angeles Gas & Electric Corp. v.
Railroad Commission of Cal., 289 U. S. 287, 53 Sup. Ct. 637, 77 L. Ed. ii8o (933).
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cost of developing a business to going concern are directly applicable
to a rate base measured by prudent investment.
The leading case defining "going concern" under the present value
doctrine is Des Moines Gas Co. v. Des Moines.2 2  Going concern was
analyzed as follows:
"That there is an element of value in an assembled and estab-
lished plant, doing business and earning money, over one not thus
advanced, is self-evident. This element of value is a property
right, and should be considered in determining the value of the
property, upon which the owner has a right to make a fair return
when the same is privately owned although dedicated to public
use." 28
"Included in going value as usually reckoned is the invest-
ment necessary to organizing and establishing the business which
is not embraced in the value of its actual physical property. In
this case, what may be called the inception cost of the enterprise
entering into the establishing of a going concern had long since
been incurred." 24
The Court held that in the evaluation of the physical plant and
in determining the overhead charges, the Master had already included
going concern value and hence no separate estimate of the amount
was necessary. In this reproduction cost rate base, going concern
value was measured by the "investment necessary to organizing and
establishing the business which is not embraced in the value of its
actual physical property." It was considered the "inception cost" en-
tering into the establishment of a going concern. This measurement
of going concern value under the reproduction cost theory is essentially
the same as the measurement for developmental costs under the pru-
dent investment theory.
Galveston Electric Co. v. Galveston25 furnishes the only direct
authority on what should constitute developmental costs under the pru-
dent investment theory. The utility attempted to compute the cost of
developing to a profitable going concern by capitalizing its past deficits.
The Master allowed this amount but the lower court disallowed it. Mr.
Justice Brandeis delivered the decision of the Supreme Court, affirming
the action of the lower court, stating:
"'If the rule were that a prescribed rate is to be held confisca-
tory in case net earnings are not sufficient to yield 8 per cent. on
the amount prudently invested in the business, there might be pro-
priety in counting as part of the investment such. amount, if any,
22. 238 U. S. 153, 35 Sup. Ct. 8n1, 59 L. Ed. 1244 (1915).
23. Id. at 165, 35 Sup. Ct. at 815, 59 L. Ed. at 1251.
24. Id. at 165, 35 Sup. Ct. at 815, 59 L. Ed. at 1251. (Italics supplied.)
25. 258 U. S. 388, 42 Sup. Ct. 351, 66 L. Ed. 678 (I921).
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as was necessarily expended at the start in overcoming initial diffi-
culties incident to operation and in securing patronage. But no evi-
dence of any such expenditure was introduced; and the claim of
the company does not proceed upon that basis. What was pre-
sented by the witnesses are studies, on various theories, of what
past deficiencies in net income would aggregate, if 4 per cent. were
allowed as a depreciation annuity and 8 per cent. compound inter-
est were charged annually on the value of the property used." 26
"A company which has failed to secure from year to year
sufficient earnings to keep the investment unimpaired and to pay a
fair return, whether its failure was the result of imprudence in en-
gaging in the enterprise, or of errors in management, or of omis-
sion to exact proper prices for its output, cannot erect out of past
deficits a legal basis for holding confiscatory for the future, rates
which would, on the basis of present reproduction value, otherwise
be compensatory. Knoxville v. Kitoxville Water Co., 212 U. S.
I, 14." 227
This is the only appropriate statement in the Supreme Court cases
on the measure of developmental costs under the prudent investment
theory. It is recognized, of course, that the statement is only dictum
and indicates what might be considered rather than what must be con-
sidered. Developmental cost as computed by the Master would include
a capitalization of losses due to iinprudence in engaging in the enter-
prise, the errors in management and omission to exact proper prices.
Obviously, developmental cost, including these items, would not be a
proper cost to be added to any rate base. It seems clear, however, that
under the prudent investment theory such developmental cost "as was
necessarily expended at the start in overcoming initial difficulties in-
cident to operation and in securing patronage" would be properly
included.
Bauer and Gold 28 summarize the result of the case, as follows:
"Judge Brandeis swept aside the entire conception that past
losses and inadequate returns can be taken as the basis of present
valuation. As a matter of investment he recognizes that actual and
necessary developmental costs might be included, if duly estab-
lished; but not past losses." 29
These cases were concerned with particular situations, and so develop-
mental costs were rather narrowly defined. They are limited to expen-
ditures "to overcome initial difficulties incident to operation and in
26. Id. at 394, 42 Sup. Ct. at 354, 66 L. Ed. at 682. (Italics supplied.)
27. Id. at 395, 42 Sup. Ct. at 354-5, 66 L. Ed. at 683.
28. BAUER & GOLD, PUBLIC UTILITY VALUATION F0R PUarOSES or RAT CONTROL
(1934).
29. Id. at 330.
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securing patronage." They embraced mere "inception costs" or "in-
vestment necessary to organizing and establishing the business." Thus,
developmental costs are so defined as to relate only to the beginning of
the enterprise. But old businesses develop as well as new. It is sub-
mitted that if a cost relates to the development of the business and can
be considered a capital item it is immaterial at what time it occurs. For
example, if an established airline secures a new route, it is believed, that
developmental cost relating to that route should be treated on the same
basis as those which occurred at an early stage of the enterprise. Any
cost at any time in the history of the business which contributes to the
development of the business should logically be included.
IV. DEVELOPMENTAL COSTS UNDER THE PRUDENT INVESTMENT
THEORY
(i) Developmental costs may be included as capital items in a
prudent investment rate base or may be written off as an operating
expense.
In two cases the Supreme Court has held rates computed under
the "present value" theory to be confiscatory because there was no
allowance for going concern value.30 The basic language relied on in
both of these cases is that in the Des Moines Gas Co. case 31 where it
is said with reference to going concern value:
"This element of value is a property right, and should be
considered in determining the value of the property, upon which
the owner has a right to make a fair return when the same is pri-
vately owned although dedicated to public use." 32
This statement is reiterated in the Los Angeles Gas Co. case 33
where the Court approved the evaluation of the commission only be-
cause there was an increment of value above historical cost which
might include going concern value.
3 4
30. McCardle v. Indianapolis Water Co., 272 U. S. 400, 47 Sup. Ct. 144, 71 L. Ed.
316 (1926) ; Denver v. Denver Union Water Co., 246 U. S. 178, 38 Sup. Ct. 278, 62
L. Ed. 649 (918).
31. 238 U. S. '53, 35 Sup. Ct. 81x, 59 L. Ed. 1244 (1915).
32. Id. at 165; 35 Sup. Ct. at 8,5, 59 L. Ed. at 1251.
33. 289 U. S. 287, 53 Sup. Ct. 637, 77 L. Ed. i18o (I933).
34. Two qualifications to this general rule should be noted. (i) A separate evalu-
ation is not necessary and a general appraisal of the physical assets in actual operation
may sufficiently include going concern value. Cedar Rapids Gas Light Co. v. Cedar
Rapids, 223 U. S. 655, 32 Sup. Ct. 389, 56 L. Ed. 594 (1912) ; Denver Union Stock
Yard Co. v. United States, 304 U. S. 470, 58 Sup. Ct. 990, 82 L. Ed. 1469 (1938) ; Des
Moines Gas Co. v. Des Moines, 238 U. S. 153, 35 Sup. Ct. 811, 59 L. Ed. 1244 (1915) ;
Dayton Power & Light Co. v. Public Utilities Commission of Ohio, 292 U. S. 290, 54
Sup. Ct. 647, 78 L. Ed. 1267 (1934) ; Columbus Gas & Fuel Co. v. Public Utilities
Commission of Ohio, 292 U. S. 398, 54 Sup. Ct. 763, 78 L. Ed. 1327 (1934) ; Federal
Power Commission v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U. S. 575, 62 Sup. Ct. 736, 86
L. Ed. 1037 (1942). Under the prudent investment theory the rate base is determined
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Under the prudent investment theory developmental costs may be
handled in one of two different ways. (i) They may be treated as a
current account and included in operating expenses. (2) They may
be treated as a capital account and included in the rate base. In dicta
in the Galveston case,35 Justice Brandeis went so far as to say that un-
der the prudent investment theory "there might be propriety" in count-
ing developmental costs as a part of the investment.3 6 But there is
nothing to indicate that such costs must be included.
While the cases are inconclusive, apparently a commission may
tieat developmental costs as either current or capital items as long as
the utility is compensated for it in one way or another. Today regu-
latory agencies generally determine the proper disposition of such
items in their uniform system of accounts. 7  It is believed that what-
ever method is followed by the commission would be approved by the
Court.3 8
(2) It is preferable to capitalize developmental cost in a prudent
investment rate base.
Developmental costs properly proved and not previously paid out
of earnings should under the prudent investment theory be capitalized
in the rate base rather than charged as a current expenditure. Once
capitalized, however, it is believed desirable to write them off over a
period of years rather than retain an intangible asset in the balance
sheet indefinitely and permanently burden the rate payer.
As a general accounting proposition, an item should be allocated
to as many periods as it is useful in the operation of the business. An
item allocated to more than one accounting period is deemed "cap-
italized." Thus the cost of a building is capitalized because it is used
for a period longer than the annual accounting period. A maintenance
cost accomplishes its purpose in one accounting period, and should be
charged off annually. Since developmental costs generally relate to
and affect a period longer than the annual accounting period, the inci-
dence of the cost should be borne by the longer period. It should be
by the amount actually invested. There is no general appraisal which is likely to in-
clude developmental costs. (2) Where the past rates charged have been sufficient to
write off developmental costs as current expenses, the Court has not required their
inclusion in the rate base. (See IV (4) infra.)
35. 258 U. S. 388, 42 Sup. Ct. 351, 66 L. Ed. 678 (1921).
36. Id. at 394, 42 Sup. Ct. at 354, 66 L. Ed. at 682.
37. Federal Power Commission-Capital account. California Railroad Commis-
sion-Current account. Wisconsin Commission-Current account. Massachusetts De-
partment of Public Utilities-Current account.
38. See, however, Mr. Justice Jackson's dissent in the Hope case, where he states:
"This attributes a significance to formal classification in account keeping that seems
inconsistent with rational rate regulation." 320 U. S. 591, 643, 64 Sup. Ct. 281, 307, 88
L. Ed. 333, 367 (1944).
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capitalized and written off over the period which it affects. The effect
on the total cost of each particular year should be charged to the operat-
ing expenses of that year. Obviously the incidence of an item like
developmental cost cannot be computed with precise accuracy and the
writing-off of such cost will necessarily be somewhat arbitrary. It is
suggested that a write-off period of twenty years might be acceptable.
Not only are developmental costs logically a capital item, but it
is more equitable to capitalize them. If they are treated as current
items, higher rates must be charged during developmental periods to
compensate for these expenditures. This puts an unfair burden on
rate payers during the developmental period. It is equitable to spread
the charge over a longer period of time. The longer period reaps the
benefit of developmental costs and should share the burdens.
The rationale of permitting developmental costs relating to more
than one account period to be capitalized has been set forth in Bauer
and Gold:
"If there were such costs, they stand basically as any other
capital costs incurred for the public service. While they are not
attached to physical or other items of property, they were never-
theless incurred for the benefit of the properties as a whole ...
"The additional cost incurred during the development period
is properly recognized as capital expenditure no different from in-
vestment in physical properties or intangible rights. It is analo-
gous to interest and other general overheads during construction.
. . . It is a part of the total investment required to establish the
business as a going concern." 39
There are, however, strong arguments in favor of charging these
developmental costs to operating expenses. In the first place, the dis-
tinction between capital and current accounts is not altogether clear.
Moreover, if developmental costs are treated as a capital item and not
written off at all, they are a permanent burden on the rate payer. Fur-
thermore, investment in developmental costs does not represent an in-
vestment in a tangible item. It is generally considered desirable ac-
counting practice to squeeze the tangibles out of the .balance sheet.
Most state commissions using the prudent investment theory have
treated developmental expenses as current items. 40 It should be noted
that in these cases developmental cost had already been recouped, and
the utility was attempting to obtain a double charge for the costs. In
39. BAUER & GOLD, PUBLIC UTILITY VALUATION FOR PURPOSES OF RATE CONTROL
(1934) 309-310.
40. See, for example, Dept. of Public Service v. Pacific Power & Light Co., 13
P. U. R. (N. S.) 187 (Wash. 1936) ; Re Los Angeles Gas & Electric Corp., P. U. R.
193I A 132 (Cal.); City of Marinette v. City Water Co., 6 P. U. R. (N. S.) 501 (Wis.
1934). With regard to Massachusetts, see WEBER, PRINcIPLFS OF PUBLIC UTILITY
REGULATIONS (1941) 135-6.
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other cases there were no records and the best guess was that such
costs had been charged to current accounts and had already been com-
pensated in the rate charged. In regulating older utilities, it seemed
likely that the rates charged in the past had covered developmental ex-
penses, and there was a natural tendency to refuse to capitalize them in
the rate base.
In most cases, however, developmental costs relate to more than
the annual accounting period and should be treated as a capital item.
Charging them as current expenses puts an unfair burden on the early
rate payer. A legitimate distinction can be drawn between ordinary
recurrent operating expenses and extraordinary nonrecurrent expendi-
tures relating to a period of time longer than the annual accounting
period. By writing developmental costs off over a limited period of
years the objections raised to their capitalization are nullified.
(3) The utility has the burden of proving developmental cost.
The Supreme Court has in several cases indicated that the bur-
den of proving developmental costs is on the utility. Thus in the Day-
ton Power & Light Co. v. Public Utilities Commission of Ohio,41 the
Court stated:
".. . upon proof of its existence it [going concern value] may
have a place in the base upon which rates are to be computed.
. . . Going value is not something to be read into every balance
sheet as a perfunctory addition. 'It calls for a consideration of
the history and circumstances of the particular enterprise.' " 42
In the Galveston case 43 no allowance was made because "no evi-
dence of any such expenditure was introduced." Likewise in Colum-
bus Gas & Fuel Co. v. Public Utilities Commission of Ohio 44 no al-
lowance was permitted because "no evidence was offered by the
appellant that expenses had been incurred" in overcoming difficulties
incident to operation and securing patronage. In the Des Moines
case 45 the Court stated: "it is not to be presumed, without proof, that
a Company is under the necessity of making up losses and expenditures
incidental to the experimental stages of its business." 46 While these
cases were decided under the reproduction cost theory, the principle
is believed applicable to a determination under the prudent investment
theory.
41. 292 U. S. 290, 54 Sup. Ct. 647, 78 L. Ed. 1267 (1934).
42. Id. at 308-9, 54 Sup. Ct. at 656, 78 L. Ed. at 1280.
43. 258 U. S. 388, 42 Sup. Ct. 351, 66 L. Ed. 678 (1921).
44. 292 U. S. 398, 54 Sup. Ct. 763, 78 L. Ed. 1327 (1934).
45. 238 U. S. 153, 35 Sup. Ct. 8I1, 59 L. Ed. 1244 (I915).
46. Id. at i66, 35 Sup. Ct. at 815, 59 L. Ed. at 1251.
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In certain cases under the reproduction cost theory, expert testi-
mony had been introduced to estimate what the developmental cost
would be were the plant reproduced. These estimates of experts have
been generally repudiated by the Supreme Court. In the Los Angeles
Gas Co. case,4r for example, expert witnesses had computed going
concern value by compiling various estimates. The Court summarily
dismissed their testimony stating:
"It is unnecessary to analyze the testimony of these witnesses,
as it is obviously too conjectural to justify us in treating the fail-
ure to include their estimates as a sufficient basis for a finding of
confiscation." 48
In the Columbus Gas Co. case 49 the Court sustained the refusal
of the Commission to include a separate allowance for going concern
value in a present value rate base. In refusing the estimates of the
company's "experts" as to what the costs of developing a business to
going concern should be, the court administered a classic judicial drub-
bing to such "expert" computations stating:
"Thus, some of the appellant's experts have included interest
or return unearned during the business development period as a
factor contributing to going value, one witness placing this fac-
tor as high as $6,300,000. Their method of computation was con-
demned by this court in Galveston Electric Co. v. Galveston, 258
U. S. 388, 394, in very similar conditions. No evidence was
offered by the appellant that expenses had been incurred 'in over-
coming initial difficulties incident to operation and in securing
patronage.' Galveston Electric Co. v. Galveston, supra....
"Other experts, who reject the factor of interest unearned
during the period of development, build their estimates of going
value upon the cost of attaching new customers to the business, a
cost not taken from the books, but merely presumed or estimated
at widely variant amounts. So far as such expenses had been
actually incurred by any affiliated company, they had already been
included as part of the cost of operation. So far as value had been
added above the moneys thus expended, there was not even ap-
proximate precision in measuring its amount.
"From the testimony as a whole one gains a definite impres-
sion that the opinions are derived for the most part from a pro-
fessed experience and understanding of business conditions gen-
erally, and very little from any knowledge of the 'history and cir-
cumstances of the particular enterprise.' " 50
47. 289 U. S. 287, 53 Sup. Ct. 637, 77 L. Ed. ii8o (I933).
48. Id. at 319, 53 Sup. Ct. at 649, 77 L. Ed. at 12oo.
49. Columbus Gas & Fuel Co. v. Public Utilities Commission of Ohio, 292 U. S.
398, 54 Sup. Ct. 763, 78 L. Ed. 1327 (1934).
5o. Id. at 412-3, 54 Sup. Ct. at 770, 78 L. Ed. at 1335-6.
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In these cases the Court was interested in measuring the "present
value" of the utility holdings. It vigorously rejected estimates of what
it "would" cost to develop the business to "going concern." More-
over, it indicated a strong preference for proof of developmental costs
actually incurred. Certainly if such estimates are rejected under a re-
production cost determination where the whole evaluation is a matter
of appraisal, they would be rejected under a prudent investment deter-
mination. It is concluded that developmental costs cannot be proved
by the estimates of experts or by capitalizing past deficits. 5 ' There
must be proof of actual expenditures made and costs incurred in the
development of the business to a going concern.
(4) The utility must prove the developmental costs have not been
recouped out of past earnings.
In many instances utilities have charged all developmental costs
to operating expenses. If the earnings during those years have been
reasonable, it is clear that these costs have already been recouped. If
a rate payer is to be protected against paying twice, these costs cannot
later be included in the rate base.
52
In the Des Moines case,53 the Court in denying any allowance for
going concern value measured by the "investment necessary to organ-
izing and establishing the business which is not embraced in the value
of its actual physical property," stated:
"For aught that appears in this record, these expenses may
have been already compensated in rates charged and collected.
' 54
This conclusion is supported in the Columbus Gas case 55 and the
Driscoll case."6
In Federal Power Commission v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., supra,
the Court stated that the company had the burden of showing that de-
velopmental costs had not been "recouped from prior earnings of the
business." After pointing out that the company had charged all de-
51. See Galveston Electric Co. v. Galveston, 258 U. S. 388, 42 Sup. Ct. 351, 66 L.
Ed. 678 (1912).
52. It has been argued that in a determination of "present value" if developmental
costs create "value" it is immaterial whether they have been recouped from prior earn-
ings. This argument finds some support in the language of some cases. Lincoln Gas
& Electric Light Co. v. Lincoln, 250 U. S. 256, 39 Sup. Ct. 454, 63 L. Ed. 968 (1919).
While the soundness of this argument may be doubted even under a reproduction cost
appraisal, it obviously is not applicable to a determination of prudent investment.
53. 238 U. S. 153, 35 Sup. Ct. 811, 59 L. Ed. I244 (1915).
54. Id. at i66, 35 Sup. Ct. at 815, 59 L. Ed. at 1251.
55. 292 U. S. 398, 54 Sup. Ct. 763, 78 L. Ed. 1327 (1934).
56. Driscoll v. Edison Light & Power Co., 307 U. S. 104, 59 Sup. Ct. 715, 83 L.
Ed. 1134 (1939).
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velopmental costs to current operations and yet had made substantial
earnings, the Court stated:
"Whether there is going concern value in any case depends
upon the financial history of the business. Houston v. South-
western Tel. Co., 259 U. S. 318, 325. This is peculiarly true of
a business which derives its estimates of going concern value from
a financial history preceding regulation. That history here dis-
closes no basis for going concern value, both because the elements
relied upon for that purpose could rightly be rejected as capital
investment in the case of a regulated company, and because in the
present case it does not appear that the items, which have never
been treated as capital investment, have not been recouped during
the unregulated period." '
In Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co.,58 the
Commission refused to include in a prudent investment rate base $17,-
ooo,ooo for well-drilling and similar expenses which had previously
been charged to operating expenses. The Court having determined
that the lump sum produced by the rate was sufficient to maintain the
financial integrity of the enterprise refused to consider whether the
Commission should have added this amount to the rate base stating:
"In view of this disposition of the controversy we need not
stop to inquire whether the failure of the Commission to add the
$17,000,000 of well-drilling and other costs to the rate base was
consistent with the prudent investment theory as developed and
applied in particular cases." "
Thus the Court upheld the rate determined by the prudent invest-
ment theory where the rate did not include large expenditures for well-
drilling which had previously been charged to operating expenses. 60
The utility has the burden of establishing that developmental costs
have not been recouped from earnings. In these cases despite the
charging of developmental costs to operating expenses, the earnings had
been sufficient to provide a reasonable return. No cases have been
found where the earnings were insufficient. In such a situation, how-
ever, the costs have not been recouped and the objection to including
them in the rate base would no longer be applicable.
57. 315 U. S. 575, 591, 62 Sup. Ct. 736, 745, 86 L. Ed. 1o37, 1052 (1942).
58. 320 U. S. 591, 64 Sup. Ct. 281, 88 L. Ed. 333 (1944).
59. Id. at 6o5-6, 64 Sup. Ct. at 289, 88 L. Ed. at 346.
6o. Mr. Justice Reed dissented from this holding because it was "illogical to throw
out the admittedly prudent cost of part of the property because the earnings in the un-
regulated period had been sufficient to return the prudent cost to the investors over and
above a reasonable return." Id. at 624, 64 Sup. Ct. at 298, 88 L. Ed. (Adv. Ops.) at
295. Mr. Justice Jackson dissented because "this attributes a significance to formal
classification in account keeping that seems inconsistent with rational rate regulation."
Id. at 643, 64 Sup. Ct. at 3o7, 88 L. Ed. at 367.
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(5) The utility must establish that developmental expenditures
have been prudently incurred.
It seems apparent that under the prudent investment theory, in-
vestment in developmental costs as well as any other investment must
be prudently made. The concept of what constitutes a prudent invest-
ment was set forth by Mr. Justice Brandeis in a footnote to his opinion
in the Southwestern Bell Telephone case,"' in which he stated:
"The term 'prudent investment' is not used in a critical sense.
There should not be excluded from the finding of the base, invest-
ments which, under ordinary circumstances, would be deemed rea-
sonable. The term is applied for the purpose of excluding what
might be found to be dishonest or obviously wasteful or imprudent
expenditures. Every investment may be assumed to have been
made in the exercise of reasonable judgment, unless the contrary
is shown." 62
It is undoubtedly true that administrative bodies should not be
too critical in determining whether an expenditure is prudent. It must
be recognized that a great many items are matters of business discre-
tion and business judgment. The language of Mr. Justice Brandeis,
however, in effect raises a presumption of prudence. It is believed that
this goes too far for practical purposes. Since the facts respecting the
prudence of an investment are in the possession of the utility, it seems
desirable to place the burden of proof upon it.
Once the facts supporting the prudence of the investment have
been introduced the administrative agency should not interfere with
business discretion or substitute its own judgment for that of the
utility. The investment should be upheld unless clearly imprudent.
But the burden of producing facts justifying the investment should be
on the utility.
V. CONCLUSION
The reticence of the new Supreme Court to interfere with rate-
making methods forecasts a new freedom for rate-making agencies. At
least, at first, these agencies are likely to turn to the general familiarity
of the prudent investment theory. When they do, it will be realized
that the new freedom imposes responsibilities of decision in rate mak-
ing which are complex and difficult.
One of the most difficult determinations, it is believed, will be the
measure of prudent investment in developmental costs. It is suggested
that before developmental costs be included in a prudent investment
rate base, the following be established:
61. 262 U. S. 276, 43 Sup. Ct. 544, 67 L. Ed. 981 (1923).
62. Id. at 289, 43 Sup. Ct. at 547, 67 L. Ed. at 986.
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(i) Developmental costs were actually incurred in a specific
amount.
(2) They are proper capital items.
(3) They have not been recouped out of past earnings.
(4) They were prudently incurred.
The utility has the burden of proving the amount of developmental
costs. This cost may not be proved by the estimates of experts nor
may it be computed by capitalizing past deficits. There must be proof
of actual expenditures made and costs incurred in the development of a
business.
In the second place, it must be established that these developmental
costs are proper capital items. A distinction must be drawn between
ordinary, recurrent operating expenses and extraordinary nonrecurrent
expenditures relating to and affecting a period of time longer than the
annual accounting period. The unique nonrecurring developmental
costs relating to the long-range activity of the carrier should be cap-
italized and amortized over a period of years.
In the third place, the utility must establish that developmental
costs have not been recouped out of past earnings. If the utility has
charged developmental costs to current accounts and the earnings dur-
ing that period have been sufficient to provide a reasonable return, de-
velopmental costs should not be included in the rate base. Otherwise,
the rate payer would be paying twice for the same cost.
Finally, the utility must establish that developmental costs were
prudently incurred. It must be recognized, of course, that, since ex-
penditures for development are largely matters of business discretion
and judgment, they should not be viewed too critically. However,
since the facts are in the possession of the utility, it seems -desirable to
place the burden of proving prudence on the utility.
Of course, rate making is not a matter of formula, but of judg-
ment. The standards outlined are not to be interpreted as rigid re-
quirements, but rather as flexible guides in a complex judgment deter-
mination. As such, it is believed that they may be usefully applied in
the new, important, formative period of rate making which we are just
entering.
